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GIVING NEW MEANING TO "HANDICAP:"
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND ITS
UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS IN PGA TOUR, INC. V. MARTIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that an all-star batter for the New York Yankees had
a circulatory disease that made it difficult and painful for him to
run. Would Major League Baseball be forced to permit a desig-
nated base runner to run for the disabled batter starting from
home plate?' Consider Jim Abbott, the successful major league
pitcher who was born without a right arm.2 Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act3 ("ADA"), could Abbott, who pitched well for
many years in the American League, which has the designated
hitter rule, force the National League, which does not, to exempt
him from its batting requirement? If so, does that mean that bat-
ting is not fundamental to the game of baseball, or that allowing
Abbott a designated hitter is a reasonable modification to his dis-
ability?
Even the faintest of baseball fans agree that batting is funda-
mental to the game. After all, where would baseball be without
Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, and Mark McGwire? But the fact that
one league allows for exemptions from the batting requirement-
better known as the "designated hitter rule"--suggests that rea-
sonable minds may differ over just how fundamental a fundamen-
tal rule of the game is.
The foregoing raises profound questions about the applications
of the ADA to professional sports. If the ADA applies to sporting
events and organizations, "are the most elite events and organi-
1. See Ted Curtis, 'Cart' Blanche?: A Decision Requiring Accommodation for a Dis-
abled Golfer Has Sports Lawyers Wondering What's Next, 84 A.B.A. J. 23 (1998).
2. See Doug Russell, Casey v. Pandora Heads to Washington, at http://www.lonl
sports.com/ftp/columnists/russelllrussel1200l0l22.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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zations... exempt from coverage?"4 And if the ADA is applicable,
what types of rules may be changed or "modified to accommodate
a disabled competitor, or are the rules untouchable because any
alteration of any rule would fundamentally alter the nature of the
competitions?"5
The question of whether the ADA should apply to sports gener-
ally-and elite professional sports specifically-illuminates the
tension between athletic competition and governmental accom-
modation.6 Casey Martin, a disabled professional golfer, has re-
cently brought this tension to the forefront.7 Martin "can do eve-
rything well in the game of golf except walk to and from shots."'
He suffers from a congenital, degenerative circulatory disorder
that manifests itself in a severe malformation of the right leg.9 In
addition to causing Martin great pain while walking a round of
golf, the disease poses the risk of fracture or hemorrhaging even
while carrying out daily activities.' °
After completing the third and final qualifying round of the
Professional Golfers' Association's ("PGA") Nike Tour, Martin re-
quested the use of a motorized cart." When the PGA refused to
exempt him from its "walking rule," 2 Martin sued the organiza-
tion in federal court.3 Martin claimed that by denying him use of
4. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Or. 1998).
5. Id.
6. See generally W. Kent Davis, Why Is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An Ex-
ample of How the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1 (1998).
7. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000).
12. The PGA, in its brief, stated that:
The PGA TOUR "hard card" provides: "Players shall walk at all times during
a stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA TOUR Rules Com-
mittee." The Buy.com TOUR "hard card" contains virtually identical lan-
guage .... The Rules Committee can permit players to ride only in those lim-
ited instances when, due to unusual course configuration or for safety reasons
(e.g., crossing streets), it is deemed appropriate to shuttle all players short
distances during an event. The Rules Committee cannot permit, and never
has permitted, a competitor to use a golf cart in the competition itself.
Brief for Petitioner, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24, (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000), avail-
able at 2000 WL 1706732, at *5 n.5.
13. Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
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a cart, the PGA failed to make its tournaments accessible to indi-
viduals with disabilities in violation of the ADA. 4
Both the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the PGA and
its tour events were places of public accommodation under the
ADA,'5 and that forcing the PGA to permit Martin to use a mo-
torized cart was a reasonable accommodation to his disability.
In addition, both courts held that Martin's use of a cart did not
fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA and its tournaments. 7
The United States Supreme Court granted the PGA's petition
for writ of certiorari," and heard oral argument in PGA Tour, Inc.
v. Martin9 on January 17, 2001.20 The principal issues before the
Court were whether a golf course is a place of public accommoda-
tion for the golfers during a professional competition, and
whether making an exception to the "walking rule" is the kind of
accommodation federal law requires.2' The first question concerns
the scope of the ADA, and the second concerns the law's applica-
tion.22
This note argues that the United States Supreme Court should
reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision. Professional sports inher-
ently discriminate against persons with disabilities. Elite athletic
competitions reward those who jump the highest, swim the fast-
est, and lift the heaviest. If it is true that professional sports test
physical performance, then what is being tested is naturally what
some will do better than others.
Casey Martin's suit represents the first time a physically dis-
abled professional athlete has used the ADA to seek legal redress
in the world of sports.' Application of the ADA to athletics raises
serious questions about the limits to which professional sports or-
14. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998).
15. Martin, 204 F.3d at 999; Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.
16. Martin, 204 F.3d at 999; Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.
17. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1002; Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251.
18. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).
19. No. 00-24 (U.S. filed July 5, 2000).
20. Transcript of Oral Argument, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2001), available at 2001 WL 41011, at *1.
21. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 LEXIS 1706732, at *1.
22. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Hears the Casey Martin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2001, at D4.
23. See Awarded, Casey Martin, TImE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 29.
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ganizations may set forth and govern their own rules of the game.
At the very least, it calls into question the role of sports organiza-
tions versus the federal power in determining whether there is a
level playing field in elite athletic competitions.
While PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin is a case of first impression,
lower courts have dealt with the application of the ADA to sports
in cases involving learning-disabled amateur athletes.24 In addi-
tion, just one day after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Martin, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Olin-
ger v. United States Golf Ass'n,25 held that forced waiver of the
"walking rule" under the ADA fundamentally alters the nature of
golf competition at the U.S. Open level.26
This note examines the Martin case and discusses its implica-
tions for all professional sports. Part II discusses the ADA, the
purposes for which it was enacted, and the case law dealing with
its application to professional sports. Part III provides back-
ground of the parties to the suit and the claims and defenses as-
serted by each. Part IV examines the District Court and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, and the reasoning undergird-
ing their determination that waiver of the PGA's "walking rule"
in Martin's case does not fundamentally alter the nature of
championship golf. Part V analyzes and critiques the lower
courts' opinions and argues for reversal of the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision. Part VI discusses the potential ramifications should the
Supreme Court affirm the Ninth Circuit decision. Finally, this
note concludes that the Martin case is a misguided one-one that
the Supreme Court will likely reverse.
24. See, e.g., McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1997); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v.
Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997).
25. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
26. Id. at 1006.
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II. THE ADA: ITS BACKGROUND AND UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH
SPORTS
A. Overview of Relevant Titles of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to ensure that the federal
government would play a significant role in protecting the rights
of the disabled.2" Noting that "some 43,000,000 Americans have
one or more physical... disabilities,"2" Congress expressly stated
that the purpose behind the ADA was to "provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."29
While ultimately comprised of five titles, Titles I and III of the
ADA are the two that are most relevant to sports law. Title I spe-
cifically states that "[nlo covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual.., in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."" One "qualifies" as a disabled person
if she proves that she has a "physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual."3 ' Unlike Title III, discussed below, Title I of the ADA
deals exclusively with employees and employment practices.32
Title III of the ADA provides that no person shall "be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of pub-
lic accommodation."33 The plain language of the statute makes
clear that a plaintiff wishing to prevail under a Title III claim
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3)-(4) (1994).
28. Id. § 12101(a)(1).
29. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
30. Id. § 12112(a).
31. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2000). "Major life activities" include "caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
382.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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would have to demonstrate that the defendant operates a place of
public accommodation. The statute provides ample guidance as to
what constitutes a place of public accommodation by citing nu-
merous entities that qualify, including but not limited to, inns,
restaurants, bars, grocery stores, parks, zoos, bowling alleys, and
golf courses. 4
Once a plaintiff has established that the defendant operates a
place of public accommodation, the defendant must show that it
has not failed to "make reasonable modifications in policies, prac-
tices, or procedures.., or accommodations to individuals with
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions."35
Thus, while Title I of the ADA deals with employees and em-
34. See id. § 12181(7). Section 12181(7) provides the following definition:
Public accommodation. The following private entities are considered public
accommodations for purposes of this Title, if the operations of such entities
affect commerce-
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or
hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as
the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center,
or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel serv-
ice, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or
lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care pro-
vider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transporta-
tion;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate pri-
vate school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of ex-
ercise or recreation.
Id.
35. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
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ployment practices, Title III is concerned with discrimination
against persons seeking to obtain goods and services at places of
public accommodation. Thus, just as employees bring Title I into
play, it is customers who trigger Title III.
B. The ADA and Sports-Case Law
A number of cases have dealt with the application of the ADA
to high school programs that ban students over nineteen years of
age from participating in athletics." Such age requirements-of-
ten called "eight-semester rules"-are designed to protect
younger, smaller players from injury, to ensure against competi-
tive advantages by teams with older players, and to discourage
"red-shirting"-the practice of schools "holding back" student
athletes until they gain athletic maturity. 7 Naturally, these age
restrictions have at times collided with the eligibility of students
who have been "held back" because of learning disabilities.
Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n3" and
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n39 reflect the
majority view among the federal circuits that any modification or
exception to the "eight-semester rule" works a fundamental al-
teration of the nature of interscholastic sports." The circuit court
in Pottgen held that waiver of the age requirement would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the high school's athletic regime,
which was designed to protect younger students from injury by
older students and to prevent "red-shirting."4 As to what reme-
dial measures were available to the student, the court in Pottgen
stated flatly that, under the ADA, "no reasonable accommodation
exists."42 The court also held that no individualized, case-by-case
assessment is appropriate where the age requirement is a sub-
stantive rule of a sports program.'
36. See Julia V. Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to
Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 186-92 (1997).
37. Id. at 186.
38. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
39. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
40. Id. at 1034-35; Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930.
41. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 930-31.
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Similarly, in Sandison, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that "[rlemoving the age restriction injects
into competition students older than the vast majority of other
students, and the record shows that the older students are gener-
ally more physically mature than younger students. Expanding
the sports program to include older students works a fundamen-
tal alteration."' The court then held that the student-plaintiffs
were not subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability.4 5
The debate over the application of the ADA to sports has not
been confined to the high school level. In Bowers v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n,46 Bowers, a learning-disabled freshman at
Temple University, was denied eligibility to play college football
under the bylaws of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA"). 47 The NCAA bylaws require student-athletes to have
graduated from high school and to have passed "at least thirteen
classes in what the NCAA defines as 'core courses."'" Because
Bowers had taken primarily special education courses in high
school-courses that did not constitute "core courses" under the
terms of the bylaws-the NCAA denied him eligibility to play
football.49
Bowers sued under Title III of the ADA, claiming the NCAA
discriminated against him on the basis of disability.0 The court
in Bowers held that "complete abandonment of the 'core course'
requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of the privi-
lege of participation in the NCAA's intercollegiate athletic pro-
gram."5 '
Thus, while there was no ADA case law with respect to profes-
sional athletics prior to the Martin case, courts had dealt with the
ADA's application to interscholastic sports. The majority theory
articulated in Pottgen, Sandison, and Bowers, however, did not
sway the federal courts in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
44. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
45. Id.
46. 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997).
47. Id. at 462-63.
48. Id. at 461. The NCAA bylaws also require that the athlete maintain "a minimum
grade-point average that varies based on the strength of the student's standardized test
score." Id.
49. Id. at 463.
50. Id. at 460.
51. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
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III. TBE PARTIES-GIVING NEW MEANING TO "HANDICAP"
Of Casey Martin, one Sports Illustrated journalist wrote, "It is
impossible not to like [him]-he's the clean-cut, courteous, ar-
ticulate, God-fearing young man we all want our daughters to
marry."52 Indeed, Martin has lived something of a charmed life,
notwithstanding his disability. He earned a golf scholarship to
Stanford University where he played piano at fraternity houses
(he is an accomplished pianist), studied economics and the Bible,
and mentored a Hispanic youth.5" He was a two-time NCAA aca-
demic All-American54 and led his team to a national champion-
ship in 1994, but not without the use of a cart.5 In fact, the
NCAA not only permitted Martin to use a cart during the na-
tional championship, it did so for the remainder of his college ca-
reer.
56
Formed in 1968, the PGA is a private nonprofit entity whose
mission is to promote golf competitions and tournaments at the
highest levels. The PGA sponsors competitions on three profes-
sional golf tours: the PGA Tour, the Nike Tour (now the Buy.com
Tour), and the Senior PGA Tour.5"
The primary means of becoming eligible to compete in PGA
tournaments is by a competition known as the-qualifying school.59
The best-scoring players in the qualifying school are allowed to
compete on the PGA Tour, and the next-best players are permit-
ted to play on the Nike Tour." Of the approximately twenty-five
million golfers in the United States, only about 200 are eligible to
52. Alan Shipnuck, As Casey Martin Made His Debut As a PGA Tour Pro at the Hope,
Reporters Hung on His Every Word, but the Fans Had Moved On, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Jan. 31, 2000, at G4.
53. John Garrity, Out on a Limb: His Parents Hoped Casey Martin Would Lead a
Normal Life. Instead He's Living an Extraordinary One, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 9,
1998, at G10.
54. Brief for Respondent, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24, (U.S. filed Dec. 13,
2000), available at 2000 WL 1846091, at *1.
55. See Davis, supra note 6, at 32.
56. Id.
57. Brief for Petitioner, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *3 n.2.
58. Id.
59. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000).
60. Id.
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compete in the PGA Tour, with an additional 170 allowed to com-
pete on the Nike Tour.6'
The qualifying school is conducted in three stages of tourna-
ment rounds.62 During the first and second stages of the competi-
tion, golfers are allowed to use carts. In the final stage of the
qualifying school, golfers are required to walk. The "walking
rule," which has been part of all PGA tour events since their be-
ginning, is intended to inject an element of physical stress and fa-
tigue into the competition.65 Indeed, the Nike Tour is, by design,
intended to be among the most difficult and challenging golf
tournaments in the world.66
After two years competing-and walking--on the Hooters mini-
tour, Casey Martin sought to become eligible for the PGA's Nike
Tour.67 He successfully completed the first two rounds of the
qualifying school, using a cart as the PGA rules allow.6' When,
however, the PGA denied Martin's requested waiver of its "walk-
ing rule" in the third and final round of the qualifying school, he
sued the organization, seeking an injunction under the ADA.69
Specifically, Martin alleged that the PGA's refusal to accom-
modate his disability violated Titles I and III of the ADA.7 ° With
respect to his Title I claim, Martin asserted that he was a "quali-
fied individual"7 ' for purposes of the ADA and that the PGA dis-
criminated against him because of his disability in regard to "job
61. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *3.
62. Brief for Respondent, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1846091, at *2.
63. Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
64. Id.
65. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *4.
66. Id. at *3.
67. See Davis, supra note 6, at 32.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Section 12111(8) of Title I reads:
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such position holds or de-
sires. For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the em-
ployer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an em-
ployer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the es-
sential functions of the job.
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application procedures, hiring, advancement, employment com-
pensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment."72
Martin's Title III claim alleged that the PGA had failed to pro-
vide him with an "accommodation or other opportunity" that was
as effective to other members of the Nike and PGA Tours." Fi-
nally, Martin alleged that "[b]ecause of his disability, [he could
not] effectively compete in the Nike Tour or the PGA Tour or ob-
tain compensation, benefits, privileges or advantages from [those
tours] unless... permitted to use a golf cart."'
IV. THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. The District Court
At its hearing for summary judgment, the PGA lodged a two-
fold defense against Casey Martin's claims. "First, it assert[ed]
that the ADA does not apply to its professional tournaments."75
Second, the PGA argued that the walking requirement is a sub-
stantive rule of its tournaments, that waiver of the rule funda-
mentally alters its competitions, and that the ADA specifically
forbids such alteration. 6
With respect to the application of the ADA to the PGA's tour-
naments, the PGA armed itself with three principal defenses.
First, it asserted that the PGA is a private nonprofit establish-
72. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *6. Sec-
tion 12112(a) reads:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job applica-
tion procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
73. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. Section 12182(a) of Title III reads:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
74. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *7.
75. Mfartin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998).
76. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
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ment exempt from the ADA. 7 Second, the PGA argued that its
Nike Tour, along with all of its tour events, do not constitute
places of public accommodation." Finally, the PGA claimed that
Casey Martin was not an employee of the PGA and that Title I
was therefore not implicated. 9
As to whether the PGA was entitled to Title I's private club ex-
emption, the district court judge found flatly that it was not.8"
The court ruled first that the PGA Tour was a commercial enter-
prise whose principal purpose was generating revenue.8 ' As to the
PGA's defense that, because its eligibility requirements were so
selective, it could not be a public accommodation, the court held
that "such... selectivity... does nothing to confer 'privacy' to the
organization." 2 The district court went on to hold that the PGA's
nonprofit status did little to bolster the PGA's private club ex-
emption claim since such status did not alter the organization's
fundamental purpose-generating revenue.83
Second, the district court concluded that the PGA's courses are
places of public accommodation within the plain meaning of the
ADA . ' The PGA argued that since the public gallery is not al-
lowed inside the playing area, its fairways and greens are not
places of public accommodation.85 The district court found this
argument flawed since it was founded on the principle "that an
operator of a place of public accommodation [could] create private
enclaves within its facility ... and thus relegate the ADA to hop-
scotch areas." 6
In one cursory sentence, the district court rejected Martin's Ti-
tle I claim, finding that he was not an "employee" of the PGA
Tour, but rather an independent contractor.87
77. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. With respect to Title I claims, an 'employer"
does not include a bona fide private membership club. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
Similarly there is an exemption under Title III for claims where the so-called public ac-
commodation is operated by a private entity. See id. § 12187.
78. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1324.
81. Id. at 1323.
82. Id. at 1325.
83. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) (1994).
84. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
85. Id. at 1326.
86. Id. at 1326-27.
87. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.
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The PGA's second defense-that the ADA does not require a
covered entity to make an accommodation to a "qualified" person
if the alteration results in an undue hardship to the entity-con-
sumed most of the court's attention.8 Specifically, the PGA urged
that the principal question before the court was whether its
"walking rule" is a "substantive" rule determinative of the out-
comes of competitions. 9 If it is, the PGA asserted, then "the ADA
consequently [did] not require any modification to accommodate
the disabled."0
The district court characterized the PGA's argument as sug-
gesting that any modification of any of its rules would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of PGA tournaments.9' The court reasoned
that this was a misguided syllogism, holding that the PGA's
stance was "simply another version of [the] argument that the
PGA Tour is exempt from the provisions of the ADA. It is not."92
The district court gave full notice to the limited case law con-
cerning the application of the ADA to sports, concluding that
Sandison, Pottgen, and Bowers dictated that courts must only ex-
amine the purpose of each rule of the competition in question to
determine whether the requested modification is reasonable.9
As to the question presented in the introduction to this note-
whether elite professional events are exempt from ADA
coverage-the district court supplied a succinct answer.94 The
court held that "[alithough the PGA Tour is a professional sports
organization and professional sports enjoys [sic] ... a much
higher profile and display of skills than collegiate or other lower
levels of competitive sports, the analysis of the issues does not
change from to the next."95
88. See id. at 1244.
89. Id. at 1245.
90. Id. at 1246.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The district court stated that:
In Sandison... the eligibility requirements imposed were closely-fitted with
the purpose of high school athletics--to allow students of the same group to
compete against each other.... Similarly, in Bowers, the issue was the "core
course" requirement for student athletes at the collegiate level.... A com-
plete waiver of the academic requirement would obviously alter the funda-
mental nature of the program.
Id.; see also supra Part I.B.
94. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.
95. Id.
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Determining that shot-making alone lay at the heart of golf,
the court failed to find logical the PGA's claim that the "walking
rule" was intended to inject an element of fatigue into its compe-
titions and that waiver of the rule would give Casey Martin an
unfair advantage over his competitors. 6 The court relied in large
measure on the testimony of an expert witness, who calculated
that approximately 500 calories are expended walking a golf
course." This energy expenditure, the expert testified, was "nu-
tritionally... less than a Big Mac.""8
Moreover, the court noted, when given the option of walking or
using a cart on the PGA's Senior Tour or Tour Qualifying Tour-
nament, the vast majority of the competitors opted to walk.9 The
court glibly held that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating."0 0
In addition, the court noted that the PGA permits the use of carts
in the first two stages of the qualifying school and on the Senior
Tour.' The court found that this was "certainly compelling evi-
dence that even the PGA Tour does not consider walking to be a
significant contributor to the skill of shot-making."02
Finally, the court rejected the PGA's claim that an individual-
ized inquiry into the necessity of the "walking rule" was inappro-
priate.' The PGA relied on Pottgen for support. 4 The Pottgen
court held that before a court reaches the question of whether a
plaintiff is a "qualified individual" under the terms of the ADA, it
must first determine whether the particular rule at issue is an
essential eligibility requirement. 5 If the rule or requirement is
essential, it is only then that a court determines whether a plain-
tiff meets the requirement, with or without a modification.0 6
The district court in Martin, however, relied on a narrow line of
cases that hold otherwise.' The court held that an individualized
96. Id. at 1250-51.
97. Id. at 1250.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1251.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1248.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1250.
104. Id. at 1249.
105. Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994).
106. See id. at 930-31.
107. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249 (citing Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th
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assessment to determine what constitutes a reasonable modifica-
tion is "highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case inquiry.""'8
Thus, the court found that the ultimate question before it was
whether allowing Martin, given his individual circumstances, the
requested modification would fundamentally alter PGA events. °9
The district court held that walking had little, if any, effect on
shot-making, and Martin's request to use a motorized cart was
"eminently reasonable in light of [his] disability.""0
B. The Ninth Circuit
Holding that "[tlhere is nothing ambiguous about [Title III]"
and that "golf courses are public accommodations,""' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court on all fronts."2
The PGA asserted four defenses against its tournaments being
classified as public accommodations. First, the PGA claimed that
if the area "behind the ropes" where the gallery is permitted to
spectate and roam is a public accommodation, then the area "in-
side the ropes" is not since the gallery is not permitted to enter
that area."' Second, the PGA argued that the restricted areas are
not being used as places of "exercise or recreation" within the
meaning of the ADA since the golfers are trying to win money."'
Third, the PGA argued that its competitions are like "mixed use
facilities," such as hotels that have separate residential wings not
covered by the ADA."' Finally, the PGA launched its blanket de-
fense-namely that there is nothing public at all about its compe-
titions."6
The court of appeals found fault with all four defenses. First,
the Ninth Circuit held that the PGA could not construe the
Cir. 1996); Stiliwell v. Kan. City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Mo.
1995)).
108. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249 (quoting Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1253.
111. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994,997 (9th Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 1002.
113. Id. at 997.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 998.
116. Id.
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meaning of public accommodation so narrowly as to permit an
event or facility to carve out separate private enclaves immune
from the ADA."' In other words, "a public accommodation could
not be compartmentalized in the fashion" the PGA wished."'
Second, the court held that even if the restricted area was not
used for "exercise or recreation" within the meaning of the ADA,
the statute also includes in its definition of public accommoda-
tions a "theater,. . stadium or other place of exhibition or enter-
tainment.""9 The court held simply that "[i]f a golf course during
a tournament is not a place of exercise or recreation, then it is a
place of exhibition or entertainment." 2 °
The claim that a golf course during a PGA tournament is a
"mixed use facility" in the form of a large hotel with a separate
residential wing was flawed in the court's eyes for one principal
reason:' 2 ' "The non-public residential wing (which would be cov-
ered by the Fair Housing Act)... has never functioned as a ho-
tel;" whereas, "[a] golf course during a tournament... is serving
as a golf course." '22
Finally, the court found troubling the PGA's blanket defense
that there is nothing at all public about its competitions. The
PGA asserted that because its tournaments are restricted to the
nation's best golfers, the courses on which they play cannot be
places of public accommodation. 123 The court found that this as-
sertion foundered on one basic ground. Specifically, the ADA cov-
ers "secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school[s] . 124 Like the PGA Tours, gaining entry to the most elite
private colleges and universities is highly competitive and in-
tense. The mere fact that there is a high degree of selectivity gov-
erning admission to these schools, however, does not remove
them from the provisions of the ADA. 25 Plainly put, the court of
appeals saw no justification in drawing a line "beyond which the
117. Id. at 997.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (1994)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 998.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (1994)).
125. Id. at 999.
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performance of athletes becomes so excellent that a competition
restricted to their level deprives its situs of the character of a
public accommodation." 26
Of greater importance to the court was the issue of whether
permitting Martin to use a golf cart would "fundamentally alter"
the nature of the PGA tour events.127 Arguing steadfastly that
such a modification indeed would occur, the PGA relied on two
principles. First, the PGA asserted that the kind of balancing of
interests in which the district court and the Ninth Circuit en-
gaged was wholly illegitimate because any modification of a rule
intended to affect the outcome of competition cannot be waived
under the ADA. 12' The PGA argued that once a rule is determined
to be "substantive," such as its "walking rule," the rule may not
be subject to exceptions in order to accommodate disability, and
no "fact-specific" balancing is warranted.1
29
The circuit court rejected this argument, noting that the PGA's
position "reads the word 'fundamentally' out of the statutory lan-
guage, which requires reasonable accommodation unless the PGA
can demonstrate that the accommodation would 'fundamentally
alter the nature' of its competition." 3 ' By the PGA's own logic, the
court reasoned, any and all modifications of its rules would be
"fundamental."'' The court went on to find that it could not de-
termine whether permitting Martin's use of a golf cart would fun-
damentally alter PGA events without first inquiring into whether
walking was fundamental to the competition. 32
Second, the PGA asserted "that it was wholly improper for the
district court to consider whether Martin's condition was such
that riding would not give him an unfair advantage over competi-
tors who walked."' 3 Relying again on Sandison and Pottgen, the
PGA argued that before a court determines whether a plaintiff is
a "qualified individual" under the ADA, it must first determine
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1000.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1000-01 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994)).
131. Id. at 1001.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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whether the particular rule at issue is an essential and necessary
eligibility requirement.13
4
The court rejected the PGA's argument, finding that Pottgen
and Sandison involved age restrictions that were "necessary to
protect the competition of the lower age group, and to prevent
'red-shirting. '',3 The court held that the record in Martin was
quite distinct from Sandison and Pottgen, especially since the dis-
trict court found that the fatigue factor injected into the competi-
tion by walking was insignificant and unnecessary.136 Moreover,
the court flatly held that it did not agree with Sandison and Pott-
gen. 137
Thus affirming the lower court, the circuit court left the PGA
nowhere to turn but the court of last resort, the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on September 26,
2000.138
V. WHY THE PGA HAS EVERY RIGHT TO BE "TEED OFF"-
ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. should
be reversed for at least three reasons. First, golf courses at PGA
events are not places of public accommodation. Second, Title III of
the ADA does not apply since Casey Martin is not a "client or cus-
tomer" of a commercial public accommodation. And finally, even if
it does apply, Title III would never require the PGA to fundamen-
tally alter the nature of its competitions at the championship
level by permitting a disabled golfer to play by a different set of
rules than his or her competitors.
A. Golf Courses at PGA Events Are Not Places of Public
Accommodation
The Ninth Circuit held that nothing about Title III was am-
134. Id.; see also Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.
1995); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
135. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001-02.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id.
138. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).
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biguous and that "golf courses are public accommodations."'39 In-
deed, a "golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation" is
specifically listed among the examples of covered entities. 4 ° But
because Title III is concerned with discrimination against persons
seeking to obtain goods or services--"customers and clients"--
from public accommodations,' 4' Congress could not conceivably
have intended the scope of Title III to extend to professional golf-
ers at elite PGA tour events.
The circuit court noted that stadiums are also listed among the
ADA's examples of public accommodations. Would the court
permit a wide receiver during the Super Bowl to use a motorized
cart on the field if the wide receiver suffered from the same dis-
ease as Casey Martin, even if the wide receiver could do every-
thing else in the game of football superbly? One would think not.
However, the operator of the stadium would be obligated, under
Title III, to provide ramps where appropriate for wheelchair-
bound spectators, since failing to do so would discriminate
against "customers" seeking to enjoy the "goods and services'"-a
football game-the public accommodation-the stadium-has to
offer. To be sure, the field at the center of a stadium during the
Super Bowl does not fall within the ADA's ambit.
The court's reading of the statutory language regarding public
accommodations is simply too broad. For instance, it strains logic
to read the ADA as decreeing an "all-or-nothing" standard with
respect to entities that may or may not be public accommoda-
tions. Put another way, there is nothing in Title III to suggest
that an entity must be either completely private, or else be a
public accommodation.'4
Similarly, there is substantial authority in the ADA to support
the fact that the PGA satisfies its "private club" exemption. The
PGA provides no services to the public whatsoever; it is a private
nonprofit entity that merely organizes sporting events.' Its com-
139. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
141. Id. § 12182(a).
142. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
143. See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, App. B, at 623-26 (2000).
144. See Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Penalty: Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc., 18 LAW & INEQ. 131, 158 (2000).
20011
384 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:365
petitors are independent contractors who seek to win prize money
furnished by outside corporate sponsors.
45
The district court focused extensively on the fact that the
PGA's "purpose" was generating revenue,146 finding that the
revenue generated by ticket sales from the non-member public
weighed heavily against the PGA's contention that it fell within
the ADA's "private club" exemption. 47 The court relied on Smith
v. YMCA148 for support, a case that held that a YMCA club that
generates a substantial amount of revenue from the general pub-
lic is not a private club. 49 The PGA, however, does not allow its
non-members access "inside the ropes," unlike the YMCA, which
allows the public access to all of its goods and services. With re-
spect to the PGA, the area of revenue generation "is the same
area that is unquestionably subject to the ADA"-the area "be-
hind the ropes" where the public gallery is free to spectate and
roam.
15 0
B. Title III Does Not Apply
As discussed in Part II.A., Title III of the ADA deals with the
marketplace.'5 ' It is designed to prevent discrimination against
customers and clients seeking the goods and services of commer-
cial entities, such as hotels or law firms.'52 Thus, it is the cus-
tomer who triggers Title III, just as it is the employee who trig-
gers Title I. Indeed, the legislative history of Title III confirms
that "Title III is not intended to govern any terms or conditions of
employment by providers of public accommodations." 54
It is difficult indeed to regard Casey Martin as being a "cus-
tomer or client" of the PGA within the meaning of Title III. The
PGA Tour is part of the entertainment industry, and Martin is
145. See id.
146. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998).
147. Id.
148. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
149. Id. at 648.
150. See Hentges, supra note 144, at 159.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
152. See id.
153. See id. § 12112(a).
154. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
382.
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merely helping supply the PGA's entertainment, much like a
classical pianist at a Carnegie Hall concert, or an actor in a
Broadway play. In the pianist and actor analogies, the audience
would be covered by Title III, the pianist and actor by Title I.
Here, Casey Martin is not seeking to enjoy the entertainment
supplied by the golf competition-at least not within the context
of Title III. The audience in attendance is.
C. The ADA Does Not Require a Fundamental Alteration of Golf
at PGA Events
The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize at least two fundamental
truths about elite athletic competitions. First, all competitors in
all sports are required to play by the same sets of rules.'55 Second,
elite athletic competitions are designed to test physical perform-
ance. 5 ' Taken together, these two oversights raise grave implica-
tions about the Martin decision and the future of professional
golf. Moreover, these oversights demonstrate that the lower
courts failed to apprehend a fundamental truth about profes-
sional sports: certain requirements or rules will affect some com-
petitors more adversely than others. Simply put, while there is a
level playing field in sports, in the end there is seldom no win-
ner-or loser.
While the Act requires entities operating places of public ac-
commodation to make reasonable modifications in order to ac-
commodate disabled persons, it contains one critical limitation:
public accommodations need not make any modifications that
would "fundamentally alter" the nature of its goods or services. 5 '
The appropriate question before the court, then, was whether the
waiver of a rule-here, the "walking rule"--for one competitor in
an elite athletic competition would fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the competition.'58 The Ninth Circuit applied a fact-
specific analysis to this question, giving weight to the relative
significance of the "walking rule" versus Casey Martin's "individ-
155. Brief for Petitioner, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *13.
156. Id.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 121S2(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
158. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000).
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ual circumstances."'59 But this approach "misapprehends the
proper inquiry."6 ° Before a court can determine whether the
waiver of a substantive rule would fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the competition, it must first look to the nature of the
"goods or services" being offered. 161
The "fundamentalness" inquiry, in this author's view, strikes at
the heart of the controversy surrounding the facts of the Martin
case. Many, if not most, baseball fans will likely bristle at the
suggestion that allowing a disabled All-Star batter a pinch-
runner starting from home plate would not fundamentally alter
the game of baseball. Indeed, these fans will argue, base-running
is as fundamental to the game as hitting. But why, then, does the
American League have the designated hitter rule while the Na-
tional League does not? Viewed in the context of the ADA, it is
hard to see how the hitting requirement is fundamental, if the
requirement may be modified in one league to accommodate, say,
a one-armed pitcher.
To the extent that Martin and his supporters feel that the
"walking rule" is simply arbitrary, one might reasonably contend
that nearly all rules of athletics are to some degree arbitrary and,
to borrow Justice Scalia's word of choice, "silly."'62 For instance,
why, in Major League Baseball, is the strike zone from the chest
to the knees as opposed to from the eyes to the hips? 63 What if
the hypothetical batter mentioned at the outset of this note had a
blood deficiency that caused him to have an excessively long
torso. Could he demand that the umpire call strikes from his eyes
to his hips?"
At the very least, professional sports may be said to be an
amalgam of subsets of arbitrary rules which, measured by their
sum, amount to well-defined tests of physical performance. What
the Court seemed to be suggesting at oral argument was that the
entire notion of "fundamentalness" with respect to professional
159. See id.
160. Brief for Petitioner, Martin, No. 00-24, available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *31.
161. Id.
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. Jan.
17, 2001), available at 2000 WL 41011, at *31.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *26-27.
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sports is misguided, if not wholly inappropriate. 165 Put another
way, the Court was careful to make light of the dilemma raised
when the ADA applies to professional sports.66
The Seventh Circuit, in Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n,167
gave proper attention to the nature of championship-level golf
and determined that all elite tour competitions must be able to
test the physical capabilities of all competitors under a uniform
set of substantive rules. 61 The Olinger case involved facts identi-
cal to the Martin case, and the Seventh Circuit held that the
waiver of the "walking rule" to accommodate a disabled player at
the championship level, "'while reasonable in a general sense,
would alter the fundamental nature of [the] competition." 69
The Olinger case, and Martin's understanding of it, seemed es-
pecially worrisome to Justice Ginsburg.17 When asked to distin-
guish Olinger from the Martin case, counsel for Martin stated
plainly: "That case was decided on a different record from this re-
cord."' Justice Ginsburg properly exposed the infirmity in Mar-
tin's logic by asking that, if it is true that the Olinger record and
the Martin record are different, then "[w]ho is the judge of
whether a person is sufficiently disabled to get a dispensation
from the nonfundamental walking requirement? Is it up to the
lawyers and the quality of the record they make?"" 2
The Court, in perhaps its most challenging question to Martin's
counsel, asked whether Martin believed the walking rule is never
fundamental, or "that with respect to Casey Martin, it's not fun-
damental because his disability has the same impact on his abil-
165. See id. at *26. The oral argument before the Supreme Court proceeded as follows:
"Mr. Reardon [Casey Martin's counsel]: [Wialking is not indeed fundamental because [the
PGA Qualifying School] doesn't require it.
Question: All that demonstrates... is that you can play the game under a different
rule.... I don't understand the whole meaning of fundamentalness with regard to sport."
Id.
166. See id. at *26-27.
167. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
168. See id. at 1006.
169. Id. (quoting Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 938 (N.D. Ind.
1999)).
170. Transcript of Oral Argument, Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2001), available at
2001 WL 41011, at *29.
172. Id. at *28.
172. Id. at *29.
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ity to play as walking has on other people."'73 This Catch-22
makes light of the conundrum raised when the ADA applies to
professional sports, and Martin's counsel was at a loss as to how
to properly couch his answer.7 4
Finally, in failing to acknowledge that high-level sports test
physical performance, the Ninth Circuit confused discrimination
with varying degrees of challenges faced by all competitors in
elite athletic competitions. 75 Put another way, any disadvantage
Martin faces is not discrimination in any meaningful sense. It
would be perverse to sanction modification of any rule of any elite
athletic competition to ensure more equal results.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT: PREDICTIONS AND POTENTIAL
RAMIFICATIONS
In its brief to the Supreme Court, counsel for Martin correctly
pointed out that "[t]he PGA has never attempted to show that the
district court's findings were clearly erroneous. Instead, the PGA
is largely reduced to platitudes to defend its choice-which is a
matter of taste, not the essentials of golf ... ,,76 One might read
this language to suggest that the PGA's defense is nothing more
than a proxy for preserving a sacrosanct golfing tradition.
17
The ADA, however, was enacted to change Americans' tradi-
173. Id. at *33-34.
174. See id. at *34 ("Mr. Reardon:... Im trying to live with both theories.").
175. Brief for Petitioner, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 1706732, at *33-34.
176. Brief for Respondent, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. filed Dec. 13,
2000), available at 2000 WL 1846091, at *45.
177. As Martin points out in his brief, there is "nothing in the legislative history that
suggests that Congress intended to exempt the sports world from the ADA." Id. at *46; see
Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Sen. Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the House Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 15 (1988). A sponsor of the ADA, then-House Majority Whip
Tony Coelho, stated:
Society has neglected to challenge itself and its misconceptions about people
with disabilities. When people don't see the disabled among our [fellow citi-
zens] ... at the sports field.., most Americans think it's because they can't.
It's time to break this myth. The real reason people don't see the disabled...
at the sports field . . . is because of barriers and discrimination. Nothing
more.
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tional attitudes toward disability.78 Indeed, the ADA's broad
scope reflects Congress's desire to help prevent discrimination
against the many millions of disabled Americans.'79 Thus, a vic-
tory for Martin at the Supreme Court would seem to comport
with the ADA's aim, all the while incorporating within its scope
an activity traditionally thought to be predicated on benignly dis-
criminatory rules.
If the Supreme Court finds persuasive the argument that the
overarching scope of the ADA must extend to golf, the Court will
have inched closer to the question of whether waiver of the
"walking rule" fundamentally alters professional golf. It is likely
that this is precisely the determination the PGA hopes to forestall
by prevailing on its theory that Title III does not apply. If Title III
applies, the Court must then determine whether allowing Martin
to use a cart fundamentally alters PGA tour events. On the sur-
face, it is unlikely the PGA will be able to successfully demon-
strate to the Justices that such a waiver alters its tournaments in
any meaningful way. As Casey Martin recently put it: "I have
never heard anyone talk about what a great walker Tiger Woods
is. -18
o
Put simply, a ruling in Martin's favor will likely rest on the
premise that the PGA's entire argument is a proxy for preserving
a time-honored golfing tradition. Such a ruling, however, would
raise serious questions about the role professional sports organi-
zations, such as the PGA, the National Football League, and Ma-
jor League Baseball, have in setting forth and regulating their
own rules. Affirmance of the Ninth Circuit decision would curtail
these organizations' autonomy in regulating the rules of their
competitions.
Moreover, a finding for Martin would call into question just
how and to what extent the PGA must evaluate future disability
claims. Specifically, what would be the standard by which to de-
termine whether a modification of a rule is "reasonable?" Would
the PGA have only the courts to turn to for each instance that an
ADA claim is brought? If so, the PGA may expect future financial
burdens, though just how steep remains unclear since there ap-
pear to be very few disabled professional athletes.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b) (1994).
179. See id. § 12101(a)(1).
180. Outside the Lines (ESPN television broadcast, Jan. 14, 2001) (interviewing Casey
Martin) (emphasis added).
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A decision in favor of the PGA, on the other hand, would signal
to Congress that the ADA is not without limits, specifically where
testing "physical ability" is a particular activity's modus operandi.
Such a ruling would leave open to debate the parameters of those
limits, and might seem to some "formalists" to run counter to the
legislative intent of the ADA. To be sure, a ruling for the PGA
would likely prompt Congress to rewrite portions of the statute to
expressly include "professional athletics" within the ADA's scope.
It is more likely, however, that the Martin decision will have
little practical effect on the game of golf, irrespective of which
party prevails. As Casey Martin's lawsuit represents the first
time a professional athlete has raised a disability claim under the
ADA, 8' waiver of the "walking rule" would not change PGA tour
events in any meaningful sense.
The graver implications arising from a decision for Martin,
however, lie in the fact that professional sports would not be the
paramount authority with respect to evaluating which rules of
the game are fundamental. This seemed most troubling to the
Court."2 Justice Kennedy, for example, questioned the practica-
bility of requiring professional sports organizations to evaluate
whether an athlete warrants an exemption from a particular rule
of the game.'83 Justice Kennedy asked whether the Court should
perhaps give great deference to sporting organizations, much the
way the Court routinely defers to agencies since it is the agencies
who have the best expertise over their subject matter supervi-
sion."
Finally, to borrow a legal metaphor, one might liken Martin's
claim to any routine Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenge. His case smacks of the discriminatory impact one set of
rules places upon him. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court
might harken back to its decision in Personnel Administrator v.
181. As discussed in this note, after Casey Martin first filed suit against the PGA, Ford
Olinger, another professional golfer who suffers from a disease that makes it difficult for
him to walk, brought an ADA action against the United States Golf Association, seeking
waiver of the "walking rule." Unlike Casey Martin, Olinger lost his court battle. See Olin-
ger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000); see also supra Part V.C.
182. See Transcript of Oral Argument, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, No. 00-24 (U.S. Jan.
17, 2001), available at 2001 WL 41011, at *32.
183. See id.
184. Id. at *33.
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Feeney,"8 5 in which the Court held that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees equal laws, not equal results."'86
VH. CONCLUSION
If it is true that professional sports test physical performance,
then what is being tested is naturally what some competitors will
do better than others. Professional sports, by their very nature,
discriminate against disability.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
should be reversed for three reasons. First, PGA events are not
places of public accommodation during tournaments. Second, Ti-
tle III of the ADA does not apply since Casey Martin is not a "cus-
tomer or client" of a public accommodation by the terms of the
ADA. Finally, even if Title III applied, it would not require the
PGA to fundamentally alter the nature of its competitions at the
championship level by permitting a disabled golfer to play by a
different set of rules.
It is likely the United States Supreme Court will find that PGA
tour events are not places of public accommodation, since one can
only imagine the precedent such a ruling would set. For instance,
a ruling in Martin's favor would certainly mean that a football
field during the Super Bowl is a place of public accommodation.
Moreover, by ruling that PGA events are not public accommoda-
tions, the Court will not have to wrestle with the PGA's far more
difficult claim-namely, that to permit Martin's use of a cart
would fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf. While
this may or may not be true, a ruling for Martin would likely in-
vite future challenges in other professional sports, thus hamper-
ing the very nature of top-level competition.
It is more likely, however, that the Supreme Court will con-
front the realities of professional sports and find that application
of the ADA to them undermines the very nature of these events,
irrespective of degree. The "walking rule" may be arbitrary, but
so too are the vast majority of rules of professional athletics. Ex-
tending the ADA to sports at the professional level makes little
sense because elite competitions inherently discriminate against
disability.
185. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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Finally, any disadvantage Casey Martin faces is not discrimi-
nation in any meaningful sense. Indeed, it would be perverse to
sanction modification of any substantive rule of professional com-
petition in order to ensure more equal results. This could not
have been what Congress had in mind when enacting the ADA.
William E. Spruill
